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INTRODUCTION: CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR COMMUNITIES
Robert N. Strassfeldt
For a few years during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
Mahoning Valley in Northeast Ohio was at the front line of debates
about the obligations, if any, that corporations owed to their
communities. During those years owners of three of the Valley's
largest steel plants ceased production and shut their doors. The
decisions to shut down resulted in approximately 10,000 lost jobs and
devastated the economies and social fabric of Youngstown, Ohio, and
its neighboring communities.' The struggle to keep the steel plants
from closing took place in many venues. Eventually, as is so often
true, the battle ended up in the courts.
Briefly during that battle, Judge Thomas Lambros considered the
possibility in United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 1330 v.
U.S. Steel Corp.2 that the U.S. Steel Corporation had obligations to
stakeholders beyond its shareholders and those persons or entities to
f Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
I For a history of the shutdowns, see generally STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST
SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOSINGS (1983). For the number of affected
employees, see id. at 6.
2 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio), affid in part, vacated and remanded in part, 631 F.2d 1264
(6th Cir. 1980)
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which it had bound itself by contract. Through his musings on the
topic, he invited the litigants to consider whether the long relationship
between the Mahoning Valley communities and the steel companies
had given rise to a property right held by those communities and the
steel workers who lived there that might limit the rights of U.S. Steel
to close shop.3
In the end Judge Lambros ruled that the steel workers had neither a
contractual right nor a property right that might impede U.S. Steel's
decision to close the plants.4 Such a property right would be a judicial
invention with no basis either in statute or in prior common law,
Judge Lambros concluded. He believed the court was unable to create
such a right from whole cloth.
In the Mahoning Valley, the steel companies were typically
viewed as the villain (or at least a villain, since fault was assigned
to others, as well) in the story. Yet under another vision
of a corporation's responsibility, the steel companies behaved
appropriately by focusing on the best interests of their shareholders
without regard for the impact of their decisions on the Mahoning
Valley communities. Ten years before the Local No. 1330 decision,
economist Milton Friedman argued that the only social responsibility
of corporate managers was to further the goals (typically making
money) of their employers: the shareholders. Any expenditure of
corporate resources to fulfill a manager's sense of "social
responsibility" that did not ultimately serve the goal of more profits,
by, for example, generating good-will or attracting better workers to a
particular community, misspent shareholders' money and was the
height of irresponsibility.6
The argument over how to characterize the corporation and
describe its obligations will doubtless continue for as long as we have
corporations. Both its friends and its critics focus on the corporation's
power, whether as a generator of economic growth and wealth or as a
careless wrecker of the people and things around it, in the singular
pursuit of profit. The New York Court of Appeals struck a typically
positive tone in calling them, "great engines for the promotion of the
public convenience, and for the development of public wealth.",
7
3 Id. at 9-10; LYND, supra note 1 at 162-67. For another interesting discussion of the
case, see Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442 (1989).
4 Local No. 1330, 492 F. Supp. at 11.
5 Id. at 10.
6 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 17.
1 Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888). The court went on to note, however,
that a corporation that acted outside of their charters or sought to monopolize their trade became
a "public menace." Id.
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Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of Columbia University
rhapsodized about the corporation in saying that: "'I weigh my words
when I say that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the
greatest single discovery of modem times. . . .Even steam and
electricity are far less important than the limited liability corporation,
and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it.'8
Others have been less enthusiastic. Justice Joseph P. Bradley is
purported to have described corporations as "'Modem Shylocks and
Railroad Smashers."' 9 Professor Joel Bakan describes them as a
"psychopathic creature." 10 Justice Louis Brandeis, noting the growing
wealth and power of corporations, described them as a "Frankenstein
monster."11 Professor Lawrence E. Mitchell compares modem
corporations to the monster-like creature of Jewish folklore, the
Golem, which unstoppably follows the orders of its creator, no matter
how destructive. 12 Finally, in its 2001 release, 1600 Transylvania
Avenue, the San Francisco Mime Troupe, a radical theatrical group,
also drew on horror film and literature imagery and likened the
corporation to a vampire, given immortal personality by the Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. 13 decision and living
on the blood of its victims.14
This Symposium is intended to broaden the discussion of the
relationship between corporations and their communities. The first
panel focuses on the continuing debate regarding stakeholder theory:
the idea that corporate law defines the obligations of corporate
managers too narrowly to the detriment of other stakeholders in the
8 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 9 (1970) (quoting 1911 remarks by Nicholas
Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, quoted in Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited
Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
473, 473 (1953) (citation omitted)) (omission in original). Butler originally made this comment
in November 1911 in an address to the 143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 21, at 43 (1917).
9 ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920, at 81 (1967) (quoting Justice
Joseph P. Bradley).
10 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER 60 (2005). Bakan asked Dr. Robert Hare, a psychologist with expertise in
psychopathy, to diagnose the corporation. Hare concluded that corporations demonstrate most
standard psychopathic traits. Id. at 56-57.
I Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 564-67 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
part). Justice Brandeis was borrowing the phrase from a book by 1. Maurice Wormser,
FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931).
12 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT 46-47 (2001). The folkloric Golem, by contrast, could be stopped by its creator.
13 Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
14 SAN FRANCISCO MIME TROUPE, Legal People, on 1600 TRANSYLVANIA AVENUE (BMI
2001).
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corporation. The relationship between corporations and their
communities raises other questions, as well. What may a community
do to attract a corporation to relocate in that community or to induce a
corporation to resist the temptation to relocate elsewhere? Our second
panel examines these questions. Finally, what may a community do
when it regards a corporation as a bad neighbor? In some cases,
communities have gone so far as to attempt to prohibit certain big box
stores, often, but not exclusively, Wal-Mart, from opening a store in
their location. More typically, they have sought to limit the behavior
of such corporations in a variety of ways ranging from aesthetics and
environmental impact to labor practices. Our third panel examines the
limits of a community's ability to restrict their corporate neighbors in
those ways.
In a keynote address, Professor Joseph Singer identifies two
assumptions that underlie the theory that limits corporate
responsibility to the well-being of shareholders. 15 First, corporations
are constrained only by existing statutes and regulations in their
pursuit of wealth. Second, whether or not current regulatory restraints
are adequate to protect the public good and stakeholders other than
shareholders does not matter because the market will correct for the
law's imperfections. In support of a theory of corporate responsibility
that couples wealth production with conformance "with minimum
standards compatible with the contours of a free and democratic
society," Professor Singer argues that both of those assumptions are
wrong. 16
He counters the first assumption, that only statute and regulation
limit the responsibility of corporations to pursue the production of
wealth single mindedly for their shareholders by reference to the
"other-regarding obligations" of tort, contract, and property law that
have long curbed the appetite to do all that the law does not expressly
prohibit in the marketplace. 17 Professor Singer more quickly
dispenses with the second assumption as "demonstrably incorrect.'
18
Events have shown, he argues, that the market alone has not
adequately protected other stakeholders (or, for that matter, defrauded
shareholders), safeguarded the environment, or fostered equality of
opportunity and outcome. 19
15 Joseph William Singer, Corporate Responsibility in a Free and Democratic Society, 58
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1031 (2008).
16 Id. at 1034.
17 Id. at 1035-38.
18 Id. at 1040.
19 Id. at 1040-41.
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The first set of articles focus on stakeholder theory. The authors
engage the ongoing public and academic debate and each other
regarding the desirability of changing corporate governance rules to
give greater say to a broad array of stakeholders.
Professor Kent Greenfield argues for a revised approach to
corporate governance that would give a voice to such stakeholders as
employees, creditors, and communities.2 ° Characterizing these
stakeholders as "investors" in a corporation, Professor Greenfield
argues that neither current corporate law nor market mechanisms
adequately protect their interests. 21 As a result, he argues,
corporations contribute to growing disparities in wealth and increased
rates of poverty.22
In response to critiques of stakeholder theory, and in dialogue with
his other panelists, Professor Greenfield argues that the contention
that shareholder primacy is justified by their status as owners of the
corporation presupposes its conclusion in its characterization of
shareholders. Nor is he persuaded by the argument that as the primary
residual claimants on the assets of the corporation, shareholders are
best situated to safeguard the well-being of the corporation. Rather,
he argues, shareholder primacy encourages managers to take greater
risks than other stakeholders, most notably employees, might prefer.
Because of limited liability and the likelihood that any shareholder
holds stock in many companies, shareholders will be risk-preferers.
While this might lead to greater firm profits, it also exposes the
corporation to greater risk of failure, with all of its attendant social
costs. 23 Finally, he contests the arguments that changes in corporate
governance rules are either unnecessary or counterproductive because
employees and others who deal with the corporation can protect
themselves contractually or by encouraging legislators to constrain
corporations with tougher labor or environmental laws.2 4
As Professor Timothy Glynn notes, "[w]ho makes corporate law
matters. 25 He therefore mostly turns his attention away from the
substantive law of corporate governance to how that law is produced.
He finds that the law gives corporate managers control over the
production of corporate law. This significantly shapes corporate law
to the benefit of managers and to the detriment of other stakeholders.
20 Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043
(2008).
21 Id. at 1043.
22 Id. at 1043-44.
23 Id. at Part II.
24 Id. at Parts III & IV.
25 Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder
Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2008).
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Congress has chosen to leave much of the content of corporate law
to the states. Consequently, a number of states that compete for
corporate charters, especially Delaware, offer a corporate law that
defers to managers and places the interests of managers and,
secondarily, shareholders, ahead of other stakeholders. Delaware has
triumphed in this competition, and its corporate law predominates. An
important reason for its predominance is the internal affairs doctrine,
a choice-of-law rule that says that one looks to the law of the state of
incorporation to determine the rules governing a corporation's
internal governance. Professor Glynn criticizes this doctrine as an
impediment to adoption of more stakeholder-friendly laws in those
states where groups other than shareholders may have the incentives
and political power to reform corporate governance law.26
The vampire returns in Professor George Dent's response to
27Professors Greenfield and Glynn. Here, however, the undead is not
the corporation, but stakeholder theory, which, according to Professor
Dent, though given a proper internment in the past, seems to
repeatedly return to haunt us. 28 Professor Dent responds broadly to
the arguments for a greater stakeholder role in corporate governance,
as well as to the specific arguments raised by Professors Greenfield
and Glynn.
Professor Dent disputes the arguments that a rule of shareholder
primacy leads to an inefficient emphasis on short-term gains and to
greater disregard for the harmful externalities that a corporation might
impose on others. He notes that the empirical basis for such
arguments is lacking and suggests that experience has shown that
stakeholders are not clamoring for a seat at the board of directors'
table. He further argues that in many instances other stakeholders are
likely to be as happy to see the corporation impose negative
externalities as would be shareholders. Moreover, there are more
effective checks on corporate irresponsibility than the addition of a
small number of representatives of other stakeholders on a
corporation's board of directors where they might have difficulty
monitoring corporate misconduct, or might be happy to indulge it if it
does not adversely affect their constituencies. Corporate behavior is
also constrained by the external legal regime, including such things as
labor and occupational safety laws and environmental laws, by the
corporation's desire to maintain a good reputation, and, at least in
some instances, by the ability of other stakeholders to discipline a
26 See id. at Part II.
27 George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 1107 (2008).
28 Id. at 1107.
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corporation by exit. Stakeholder theory, he argues, inadequately
explains why these mechanisms will not suffice to constrain corporate
misbehavior.2 9
Turning to Professor Glynn's recommendations, Professor Dent
criticizes a number of Professor Glynn's suggestions regarding
substantive corporate governance law.3 Professor Dent is less critical
of Professor Glynn's primary argument that courts should abandon
the internal affairs doctrine in favor of applying the law of the
primary contact state. Nevertheless, he questions whether such a
doctrinal switch would accomplish much, since he argues that states
that now were able to exercise greater muscularity in the law of
corporate governance would, instead, largely mimic the Delaware
code.31
In the end, Professor Dent argues that the problem is not too much
solicitude for shareholders, but too little. He argues, as he has done
more fully elsewhere,3 2 for a more robust regime of shareholder
protection.
33
In a time of easy capital mobility and global economic
competition, states and local communities struggle to attract and to
retain firms. The second set of articles addresses such strategies as tax
abatement and subsidies, including condemnation for private
economic development that communities turn to either to exploit or to
deter capital mobility.
Professor Edward Zelinsky writes as a reformed promoter of tax
inducements to corporations for economic development.34 Professor
Zelinsky rejects two opposing views of tax incentives: that as tax cuts
they are always good; or that as violations of the dormant Commerce
Clause they are always unconstitutional. Instead, he occupies a
middle ground that they pass constitutional muster and might
sometimes be useful "signaling devices" to firms.35 Nevertheless, he
now views them with skepticism. While he regards tax competition
among states and localities as beneficial, he believes that targeted tax
incentives, by contrast, "are generally inefficient and unfair.
'
"
36
29 See id. at Part I.
30 See id. at Part II.B.
31 Id. at Part V.
32 George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP.
L. 39 (2005).
33 Dent, supra note 27, at Part VI.
34 Edward Zelinsky, Tax Incentives for Economic Development: Personal (and
Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1145 (2008). Professor Zelinsky promoted
targeted tax incentives not only in academic debate, but also in his capacity as a New Haven city
official. Id. at 1145-46.
35 Id. at Part I.
36 Id. at 1147.
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The inefficiency of targeted tax inducements flows from a number
of problems that Professor Zelinsky analyzes, including the
asymmetry of knowledge about corporations' real preferences, which
enhances their ability to bluff, and the short time horizons of
politicians, who may opt for immediate gains that are costly long into
the future. The unfairness obviously results from the uneven
distribution of tax burden, which, in turn, will lead to clamoring from
other corporations for similarly favorable treatment.37 Given the
incentives that Professor Zelinsky identifies to give tax abatements,
and the collective action problem-that each local community must
fear that even if their neighbors would jointly agree not to compete
through tax incentives, some community, somewhere, would-he
sees little hope for self-discipline as a check on continuing reliance on
tax incentives.38 He concludes by suggesting the possibility that
Congress and state legislatures might impose such discipline from
above. His skepticism, however, reaches this solution, as well.39
Professor Morgan Holcomb and Nicholas Smith focus not on the
strengths or weaknesses of targeted tax incentives, but on the perils of
litigating their legality.40 Plaintiffs in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno4' learned how hard it is to litigate this issue when the United
States Supreme Court rejected their dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine challenge to Ohio tax incentive legislation on standing
grounds, thereby never reaching the merits. The Court held that the
challengers to the Ohio tax incentive system lacked standing either
under basic standing doctrine or as state taxpayers.42
In the wake of Cuno, opponents of tax incentive systems have
turned to state courts and relied, primarily, on state constitutional
grounds. Professor Holcomb and Smith examine the fate of such
37 Id. at Part II.
38 Id. at Part III.
39 Id. at 1154.
40 Morgan L. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smith, The Post-Cuno Litigation Landscape, 58
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1157 (2008).
41 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
42 Regarding traditional standing doctrine, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs'
assertions of injury in fact, causation, and redressability were all too speculative to sustain
standing. Id. at 342-46. Regarding taxpayer standing, the Court reaffirmed its position that
assertions of taxpayer standing against a state would be analyzed under the same narrow rules
that apply to assertions of taxpayer standing against the federal government. Id. That doctrine,
which saw brief light in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), was significantly circumscribed in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982). Indeed, while the Court refused to overrule Flast in its most recent
encounter with taxpayer standing, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S.
587 (2007), there is reason to believe that nothing really remains of taxpayer standing, or that, at
any rate, trying to get into federal court on the basis of taxpayer standing in a claim against the
federal government or a state is much like trying to pass a camel through the eye of a needle.
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challenges in Minnesota and North Carolina state courts, where
claims have, again, mostly crashed on the rocks of standing, though
there have been adverse merit rulings on some claims that survived
standing challenges. They criticize the application of state standing
doctrine in these cases as too stringently applied.a3
Professor Ilya Somin examines the susceptibility of private
economic development takings to capture by rent-seeking special
interest groups and the failure of most post-Kelo v. City of New
London44 legislation to deal effectively with the rent-seeking
problem. a Both problems, he argues, stem in significant part from the
deliberate (and rational) ignorance of the electorate regarding the
intricacies of economic development takings.46
Given the broad reach of "economic development," the
opportunities for rent-seeking in takings on behalf of private owners
for economic development purposes are plentiful. Voters and the
political process are inadequate monitors of this tendency because the
costs of determining the benefit of a taking are high while the value of
such information to the individual voter is low. Information costs are
high because these plans are often complex and any economic benefit
occurs over a long time horizon. The value of such information, a
collective good, on the other hand, is low to any individual voter, who
recognizes that his or her potentially disciplining vote will have
limited impact or personal benefit.
For the same reason, the prospect for much effective post-Kelo
legislation that would limit economic takings abuse is slim. While
polls indicate that there was widespread hostility to Kelo, they also
demonstrate that people are unaware of and uninterested in the details
(and typically even the existence) of anti-Kelo legislation for the same
reasons that they are not active monitors of economic development
takings. Professor Somin suggests that, consequently, most state
legislatures have contented themselves with enacting ineffective
"position-taking" legislation that satisfies their constituents' desire for
a response, while causing little offense to powerful developer and
other business groups, who are satisfied with the toothlessness of the
43 As Holcomb and Smith show in Minnesota and North Carolina, post-Cuno challenges
initially raised the dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine claim. Holcomb & Smith, supra note
40, at Part IV. In a subsequent round of litigation in both states, the plaintiffs abandoned the
dormant Commerce Clause issue. Presumably, they did so in order to render their suits
unremovable to federal court in the hope of encountering more favorable standing doctrine
based on state law. Id. at Part V.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
45 Ilya Somin, The Politics of Economic Development Takings, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1185 (2008).
46 Id. at 1185-86, Part I.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
legislative response.47 He suggests that while a small number of states
have responded more aggressively, the most effective responses to
Kelo will have to come from the courts.48
Attorney Steven Kaufman considers the obstacles to regional
economic development in the aftermath of Kelo.49 Kaufnan argues
that many regional economies, especially those in metropolitan areas
whose economies relied in the past on heavy industry, face economic
obsolescence if they are unable to plan and implement competitive
regional strategies for economic development.5°
Kaufman contends that critical to regional economic success is
elimination of intra-regional community competition. Also critical is
the availability of eminent domain for the purpose of economic
development whether by government entities or private developers.
Community competition is a continuing challenge that often vexes
regional solutions. In the aftermath of Kelo many state legislatures
and courts have curtailed the ability of communities to use eminent
domain for economic development done by private developers, and
Kaufman examines some examples of this backlash.5'
Kaufman calls for greater clarity in the law regarding the level
of deference due to legislative decisions regarding economic
development takings. He asks that the legislative and judicial reaction
to Kelo not undermine the powerful tool of economic development
takings, while focusing, instead, on greater protections against the
abuse of legislative power in these matters.52
The final panel turned to the question of local regulation of
corporations perceived to be bad or unwelcome neighbors. In the
most extreme instances, communities have sometimes organized to
bar big box stores, often Wal-Mart, from locating in their
communities. Short of that, communities have wrestled with what sort
of restrictions they may legally place on big box stores and other
corporations whose presence they might perceive as a mixed blessing.
Professor Patricia Salkin examines the variety of tools available to
communities that seek to restrict "formula businesses" from locating
within them, or to control the behavior of those businesses when they
do establish a presence in a particular community.53 Formula
47 Id. at Part II.B.2.
48 Id. at 1197-98.
49 Steven S. Kaufman, Regional Economies and the Constitutional Imperative of Eminent
Domain, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1199 (2008).
5o Id. at Part I.
51 Id. at Part I1.
52 Id. at 1232.
53 Patricia E. Salkin, Municipal Regulation of Formula Business: Creating and Protecting
Communities, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1251 (2008).
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businesses are not only the prototypical big box stores, but all
businesses, including restaurants, banks, hotels, and other retail
stores, that through their business plans and contracts require
uniformity in such features as decor, architecture, standardized
products or service, and methods of operation.
Communities may seek to restrict or regulate such enterprises for a
variety of reasons, some legal and others legally problematic.
Communities act out of a desire to retain community character and
aesthetics, especially in unique communities that are dependent on the
tourist trade. They may also act out of concern about various
environmental impacts including storm water runoff from large
parking lots, light pollution, increased traffic, and urban sprawl. Some
formula businesses have prompted community reactions based on
social equity concerns, generally related to an enterprise's labor
practices, either domestically or internationally, or environmental
practices. Finally, and importantly, communities act out of concern
about economic impact, both on the community as a whole, and on
local businesses that may find it difficult to compete with large chain
stores.
Professor Salkin surveys and analyzes a large array of tools
available to communities seeking to restrict or restrain formula
businesses. Many of these are traditional and newer mechanisms of
land use control ranging from zoning to comprehensive land use plans
to historic district regulations to limitations on the ability of big box
stores to abandon their property without providing for its sale,
upkeep, or demolition, with many stops in between.54 In addition to
these methods, she also analyzes a variety of economic and social
controls including economic impact reviews and private agreements
between community groups and developers known as community
benefits agreements. She notes that motive can be critical when a
community restricts or restrains formula businesses and that
regulation for the purpose of economic protectionism might be
deemed an unlawful interference with out of state commerce under
the dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine.55 She concludes that careful
planning and consensus building within a community can produce
workable checks on formula businesses.56
Professor Brannon Denning explores further the dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine's limits on the regulation of big box and
other formula stores.57 He notes that, to date, the dormant Commerce
54 Id. at Part II.
55 Id. at Part III.
56 Id. at 1287.
57 Brannon P. Denning, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on the Regulation of Big
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Clause claims have not fared well in challenges to local ordinances
that restrict or effectively exclude big box and formula stores. He
begins by critically examining the two most recent decisions
involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to such local
ordinances: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Turlock58 and Island Silver &
Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada.9
Professor Denning then ponders why dormant Commerce Clause
claims have had so little success in challenges to local ordinances
regulating big box stores and other formula businesses. He posits that
one reason is simply the confusing signals that the Supreme Court has
itself sent in this area. Consequently, federal judges find this area
confusing and fail to understand that proof of protectionist purpose in
and of itself is sufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance, just as they
fail to make appropriate use of evidence of discriminatory effects.
More than mere confusion is at work, however. Drawing on recent
work by Professor James Whitman that contrasts a "producerist"
impulse in European law and a "consumerist" impulse in U.S. law,
Professor Denning argues that deference to box store restrictive
ordinances represents a producerist hold-over in the landscape of
American law. 60 Why then should such a sport survive dormant
Commerce Clause challenges? Professor Denning hypothesizes that
the difference between a more robust application of the dormant
Commerce Clause to producerist legislation on the state level and a
more deferential approach to local regulation may reflect judicial
deference to local land use regulation and reluctance to second guess
local interests.
6 1
Finally, attorney Catherine LaCroix considers mechanisms by
which states and local governments can help to mitigate the
environmental impacts of big box and other formula businesses.62
Among these mechanisms are environmental impact statements (EIS)
pursuant to the requirements of State Environmental Policy Acts
(SEPAs).
LaCroix examines the implementation of SEPAs in New York,
Washington, and California and describes their potential power in
reshaping the impact of formula businesses on local communities.
Boxes and Chain Stores: An Update, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1233 (2008).
58 483 F.Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
59 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
60 Denning, supra note 57, at Part Ill.
61 Id. at 1249.
62 Catherine J. LaCroix, SEPAs, Climate Change, and Corporate Responsibility: The
Contribution of Local Government, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1289 (2008).
1028 [Vol. 58:4
2008] INTRODUCTION: CORPORATIONS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 1029
She notes that through the process of determining the environmental
impact of siting and other decisions relating to businesses, state
environmental agencies and local zoning and land use boards may be
able to identify and mitigate environmental impacts that might not
otherwise be regulated by federal or state environmental laws. 3 This
may be particularly true regarding land uses that contribute to global
climate change. She also argues that even in the absence of a SEPA
local governments might be able to require an environmental impact
inquiry pursuant to either their powers to regulate land use or their
home rule power. Finally, she offers the hopeful expectation that state
and local EIS requirements may foster greater corporate social
responsibility.
64
We have witnessed a series of dramatic and troubling events since
the participants in this Symposium presented their papers. In the
words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, the economy has "'fallen
off a cliff.' ' 65 In the wake of this deep recession and the failure or
near collapse of a number of prominent financial institutions, there is
a growing distrust in the ability of loosely regulated or unregulated
markets to self-correct. Further, in the face of growing economic
distress, Americans, once again, appear to be taking a populist turn
against what are often seen as irresponsible and greedy corporations.
To date, that populist sentiment has focused primarily on issues of
executive compensation, especially within corporations that have
received federal financial bailouts. It is too soon to tell whether or not
that sentiment will also result in a broader willingness to reconsider
fundamental questions of corporate governance. The financial crisis
and recession have, in turn, threatened the viability of numerous
corporations. As a result, questions of what might local communities
and the nation do, not only to retain but to sustain weakened
corporations have come to the fore, again.
63 Id. at Part II.
64 Id. at Part HII.
65 Warren Buffett to CNBC: Economy Has "Fallen Off a Cliff," Posting of Alex Crippen
to Warren Buffett Watch, http://www.cnbc.com/id/29592831 (Mar. 9, 2009) (quoting Warren
Buffett's statement during an appearance on CNBC's Squawk Box); Jonathan Stempel, Buffet
Says Economy Fell Off Cliff, REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/
newsOne/idUSTRE5282J820090309.

